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BOOK REVIEW
Procedurein Anti-Trust and Other ProtractedCases. A report adopted
by the Judicial Conference of the United States. Washington:
Administrative Office of the United States Courts, Supreme Court
Building (distributor), 1951. Pp. 40.
This publication is a report of a committee of the Judicial Conference of the United States and relates primarily to procedural guide
posts, that treat of a number of the common problems unique to "The
Big Case." The committee, which handed down the report, comprised
experienced trial and appellate court jurists who have repeatedly encountered difficult procedural questions of cases of protracted length
and they outline in the report those methods they believe to be particularly effective.
"The Big Case" is one of prolonged proceedings with a resulting
voluminous record. Anti-trust litigation is most representative of this
type of case and some patent proceedings reach like proportions. In
cases of this nature the problem arises of meeting in an expeditious
manner the tremendous amount of evidence, both oral and documentary,
with which the Court is met. A few cogent examples may show the
burden that will exist if the court permits normal adversary procedure
to take place throughout the proceedings: in the Hartford-Empirecase
3,300 exhibits were considered and 18,000 pages of record were made;
in the Libbey-Owens-Ford case there were 6,000 exhibits proposed to
be offered of which 900 were eventually received; in the recent United
Shoe Machinery case, the Government offered 4,600 exhibits at one
time; and, in Fergusonv. Fordand Dearbornthere were 27,000 exhibits
and 70,000 pages of record.
Further complicating the Judge's work in cases of this nature are
the broad general pleadings which allege such items as conspiracy or
patent infringement in general terms. Conspiracies which are alleged
sometimes extend backward over periods up to sixty years and counsel
at the time of instigation of suit has little knowledge of what may turn
up in the way of evidence. While the trial judge may strive for well
defined issues as soon as practically possible, he will find it extremely
difficult to do so in the face of counsel's evasiveness that results from a
desire not to tip one's hand and from the hope of finding substantially
more material evidence as the case proceeds.
Procedural controls on the part of the Court must be adopted to
minimize the amount of organizing and study that will be necessary to
come to a determination of the issues. Counsel can not be permitted to
try "The Big Case" as they see fit. Exhaustive cross-examination,
surprise introduction of documents, haphazard arrangements of evidence
and exhaustive open court preliminary hearings cannot be tolerated.
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The first step of the trial judge is to particularize issues. Vague
complaints and reluctance on the part of counsel to be specific during
preliminary stages must be met by a determination to arrive at the
issues promptly, so that later proceedings will not become unwieldy.
The submission of pretrial opening statements, interchange of exhibits
between parties and the synopsizing of bulk evidence in advance, all of
which is quite foreign to general trial practice techniques, are recommended pretrial procedures.
Of special interest in the well conducted "Big Case" are procedures
that at first glance appear to be radical departures from some of our
rather well developed and cherished methods of trial. For example, in
the offering of a document, the question of relevancy or materiality is
raised by the opposing party in the usual law suit, but in a case of great
bulk of evidence it has been found more expeditious to have the offering
party specifically show materiality and relevance before receipt into the
record. Then again, it is suggested that evidence, although material, but
not necessary for determination of the issues be excluded if there be
other evidence that supports a similar decision. While this latter procedure is an expansion of the rule as to materiality, it is not a deviation
from the general principles underlying the rule.
It is also suggested in the report that in some instances a witness be
employed to orally relate the contents of considerable numbers of
documents rather than to put the multitudinous documents into the
records. Narrative variations of voluminous depositions are another
innovation.
Of particular interest was a portion of the report dealing with the
proof of scientific and technical facts. Issues technical in nature have
bothered the Patent Bar for some time. There are those that feel that
the lay judge does not readily grasp and appreciate the complexities and
subtleties of technical theory and data, with the result that there is a
tendency on the part of the court to over simplify the steps taken in the
development of new and novel apparatus. Lacking the insight of the
difficulties of advancing a particular art Courts deny a finding of
invention, whereas a technically trained man may often arrive at the
opposite conclusion. The use of technically trained masters for patent
cases might be explored with interesting results.
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